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THE E!DROGEN BO1B TFSTS AND TH MTEMATONAL LAW OF TIM SEA
From high quarters has come the suggestion that the hydrogen bomb
tests conducted by the United States off the Pacific islands, held by it
under strategic Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations, contra-
vene the customary public international law of the sea. Thus Earl
Jowitt remarked in the House of Lords:
I am entirely satisfied that the United States, in conducting these
experiments, have taken every possible step open to them to avoid any
possible danger. But the fact that the area which may be affected is
so enormous at once brings this problem: that ships on their lawful
occasions may be going through these waters, and you have no right
under international law, I presume, to warn people off.'
In a recent issue of the Yale Law Journal this suggestion has been elab-
orated by Dr. Emanuel Margolis into a comprehensive attack upon the
legality of the tests.2  The thesis of Dr. Margolis is, in brief, that the es-
tablishment of "a 400,000 square mile 'warning area' cannot be recon-
ciled" with "the international law principle of freedom of the seas and
its attendant corollaries, freedom of navigation (of both the sea and the
air), and freedom from interference with the lawful pursuit of maritime
industries (fishing, transport, and the like)." a Freedom of the seas is
urged as "an absolute freedom" except as modified by certain "general"
police powers, emerging from "custom" and "not being limited to par-
ticular maritime zones," and by "special" police powers, existing only
"by virtue of treaties" and applying "exclusively to the states which are
parties to them." 4 The warning areas established for the hydrogen bomb
tests cannot, it is argued, be justified under either class of powers.
The purpose of this editorial is to indicate that this evaluation of the
hydrogen bomb tests completely misconceives the nature and requirements
of the international law of the sea and unnecessarily impugns the legality
of measures commonly regarded as indispensable to the security of the
free world.5
From the perspective of realistic description, the international law of
the sea is not a mere static body of rules but is rather a whole decision-
1 186 H11. Deb. (5th Ser.) 808-09 (1954).
2 Emanuel Margolis, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and International Law," 64 Yale
L. J. 629 (1955). It is also argued in this article that the tests are in violation of
both the U.N. Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement for the former Japanese Mandated
Islands and of certain alleged prescriptions with respect to the pollution of interna-
tional waters and airspace.
sIJ. 635, 630. 4Id. 634, 635.
5 For a more comprehensive and detailed development of this theme, see Myres S.
McDougal and Norbert A. Schlci, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security," 64 Yale L. J. 648 (1955), with a statement of the facts and a
collection of authorities in support of the points made in this editorial.
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making process, a public order which includes a structure of authorized
decision-makers as well as a body of highly flexible, inherited prescriptions.
It is, in other words, a process of continuous interaction, of continuous de-
mand and response, in which the decision-makers of particular nation states
unilaterally put forward claims of the most diverse and conflicting charac-
ter to the use of the world's seas, and in which other decision-makers, ex-
ternal to the demanding state and including both national and international
officials, weigh and appraise these competing claims in terms of the interests
of the world community and of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept
or reject them. As such a process, it is a living, growing law, grounded
in the practices and sanctioning expectations of nation-state officials, and
changing as their demands and expectations are changed by the exigencies
of new interests and technology and by other continually evolving condi-
tions in the world arena.
The factual claims asserted by nation state decision-makers to the use of
the world's seas, the events to which the "regime of the high seas" is au-
thoritative response, vary enormously in the comprehensiveness and par-
ticularity of the interests sought to be secured, in the location and size of
the area affected, in the duration of claim, and in the degree of interference
with others. Such claims range, in rough categorization, from the compre-
hensive and continuous claim to practically all competence in the "terri-
torial sea," through the continuous but limited claims to navigation, fish-
ing, and cable-laying upon the "high seas," to the relatively temporary
and limited claims to exercise authority and control beyond territorial
boundaries for a vast array of national purposes, such as security and self-
defense, enforcement of health, neutrality and customs regulations, consdr-
vation or monopolization of fisheries, exploitation of the sedentary fisheries
and mineral resources of the sea bed and continental shelf, the conducting
of naval maneuvers and other military exercises, and so on. It may be
observed, however, that, despite their variety in institutional nuance, all
these claims share certain common characteristics: they are all unilateral
assertions of demands by particular claimants to the individual use of a
great common resource and all are affected in equal degree-navigation and
fishing no more and no less than the others--with a community interest in
fullest utilization and conservation and with specific national interest,
which, though varying in particular instances with geographic propinquity,
is in the sum of all instances common to all claimants.
The authoritative decision-makers put forward by the public order of the
high seas to resolve all these competing claims include, of course, not merely
judges of international courts and other international officials, but also
those same nation-state officials who on other occasions are themselves claim-
ants. This duality in function ("didoublement fonctionnel"),6 or fact
that the same nation-state officials are alternately, in a process of reciprocal
interaction, both claimants and external decision-makers passing upon the
claims of others, need not, however, cause confusion: it merely reflects the
6 Schiffer, The Legal Community of Mankind 264 (1954), presenting the views of
Georges Scelle.
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present lack of specialization and centralization of policy functions in inter-
national law generally. Similarly, it may be further observed, without
deprecating the authority of international law, that these authoritative
decision-makers projected by nation states for creating and applying a
common public order, honor each other's unilateral claims to the use of
the world's seas not merely by explicit agreements but also by mutual
tolerances-expressed in countless decisions in foreign offices, national
courts, and national legislatures-which create expectations that effective
power will be restrained and exercised in certain uniformities of pattern.
This process of reciprocal tolerance of unilateral claim is, too, but that by
which in the present state of world organization most decisions about juris-
diction in public and private international law are, and must be, taken.7
The overriding policy which has in the past infused this whole decision-
making process, and which from the perspective of rational preference
should continue to infuse it, is not the negation, but rather the encourage-
ment, of use. The major policy purpose inspiring the regime of the high
seas has been not merely the negation of unnecessary restrictions upon navi-
gation and fishing, but also the effective promotion of the fullest, peaceful,
and conserving use and development by all peoples of a great common re-
source, covering two thirds of the world's surface, for all contemporary
values. The concept of a common and reciprocal interest in fullest utili-
zation has underlain, and should continue to underlie, the whole flow of
decision.8
For implementing this overriding policy of fullest, peaceful utilization
in resolving the conflicting claims which confront them, the authoritative
decision-makers of the world community have elaborated a comprehensive
body of technical doctrine, "the regime of the high seas," composed of two
complementary sets of prescriptions. The one set of these prescriptions,
that generally referred to under the label of "freedom of the seas," was
formulated, and is invoked, to honor unilateral claims to navigation, fish-
ing, cable-laying, and other similar uses. The other set, that which in-
eludes the prescriptions summed up in a wide range of technical terms such
as "territorial sea," "contiguous zones," "jurisdiction," and " continental
shelf," was formulated, and is invoked, to honor all the great variety of
claims, both comprehensive and particular, which may interfere, in greater
or less degree, with navigation and fishing. To the initiated, these pre-
scriptions and technical terms are not absolute, inelastic dogmas but rather
7 It is not of course the unilateral claims but rather the reciprocal tolerances of the
external decision-makers which create the expectations of pattern and uniformity in
decision, of practice in accord with rule, commonly regarded as law.
The great bulk of claims to authority and control upon the high seas are honored
and protected, it may be emphasized, not by explicit bilateral or multilateral agreement,
but by this process of mutual tolerance. The decision-makers of the world community
have never regarded themselves as confined within any such categorization as that of
"cgeneral"' and "special" powers propounded by Dr. Margolis.
sExcellent statements of this positive policy of promoting, rather than restricting,
use may be found in Lauterpacht, "Sovereignty over Submarine Areas," 27 Brit.
Y.B. Iut. L. 376, 378, 407 et seq. (1950), and in U.N. Secretariat, Regime of the High
Seas, U.N. Doe. No. A/CN.4/32, at 10, 12 (1950).
HeinOnline -- 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 358 1955
EDITORIAL COMMENT
flexible policy preferences, permitting decision-makers a very broad dis-
cretion for adjusting particular controversies in terms of the multiple vari-
ables peculiar to each controversy and for promoting major policies. For
all types of controversies the one test that decision-makers have in fact in-
voked and applied is that simple and ubiquitous, but indispensable, stand-
ard of what, considering all relevant policies and variables in context, is
reasoiable as between the parties; 9 and for the clarification of detailed
policies in ascribing meaning to particular prescriptions and terms, such
decision-makers have habitually turned to all those sources authorized for
the International Court of Justice, including not only "international con-
ventions, whether general or particular" but also "international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law," "the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations," "judicial decisions and the teach-
ings of the most qualified publicists," and considerations "ex aequo et
bOno." 10
The concept of "freedom of the seas" was introduced into international
law, as is well known, to combat certain broad claims to territorial sover-
eignty over vast sea areas asserted by various nation states in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. The object of such claims was to monopolize
both fisheries and trade with areas thought particularly rich in resources.
The policy projected in "freedom of the seas" was designed to foster trans-
portation and communication free of restrictions imposed by any nation
state for the purpose of restricting commercial gain to itself, and to pro-
mote equality of access to fisheries free of comparable claims to monopoly.
It is in this sense that the policy finally triumphed to universal acceptance
and has long been applied to promote the utmost practicable freedom of
navigation and fishing and to minimize international friction by confining
each state's regulatory power, where possible, to ships flying its own flag.
From the beginning of the modern law of the sea, it has, however, been
recognized that nation states and their peoples have interests in the world's
seas other than navigation and fishing, and the decision-makers of the world
community have projected and applied a great variety of prescriptions
honoring claims to authority and control for the protection of such inter-
ests, even against protests that such claims interfere with navigation and
0 The test is well stated in Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea 20 (1950). See
also Jessup, Law of Territorial Waters 91-101 and passin (1927); Masterson, Juris-
diction in Marginal Seas xiii-xviii, 375 et seq. (1929); Dickinson, "Jurisdiction at
the Maritime Frontier," 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1940).
10 Stat. I.C.J., Art. 38. A decision-maker is thus not confined, in determination of
lawfulness, to explicit agreements or inferences from prior customary behavior, but
may draw creatively upon a great variety of principles, precedents, analogies, and
considerations of fairness. An excellent example of this process by which external
decision-makers appraise unilateral claims is offered by the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case, Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116. In this case Norway as-
serted claims which could not be justified by reference to either explicit agreement or
widely accepted custom, and which had been protested by other nation states, but by
drawing upon all relevant sources of policy and a great variety of considerations in
the context, the Court concluded that Norway's claims were lawful. See Waldock,
"The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case," 28 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 114 (1951).
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fishing. Nation states have almost immemorially and universally de-
manded comprehensive governmental powers, subject only to "innocent
passage," for the protection of all national interests in a littoral belt of
the seas adjacent to their shores, and in contemporary international law
this demand is honored in high measure under the concept of a "territorial
sea." So intense, nevertheless, has been the conflict of claims and inter-
ests at the outer boundaries of this belt, that even the most basic elements
of prescription are still unsettled: not only is the width of the area which
may be claimed still disputed, but also the base line from which this un-
known width must be measured, and the very degree and scope of the au-
thority that may be exercised within the area once its limits are ascertained.
Serious harm to community and national interest from this conflict has,
fortunately, been avoided by the formulation of a set of safety-valve con-
cepts, such as "contiguous zones," "jurisdiction," "continental shelf,"
and so on, which are now invoked to honor reasonable claims to national
competence far beyond "territorial seas" for virtually all identifiable na-
tional interests. The history of this development with respect to claims
for the enforcement of customs regulations, the protection of the security
of neutrals against belligerent activities, the conservation or monopoliza-
tion of fisheries, the exploitation of the sedentary fisheries and mineral re-
sources of the sea bed and continental shelf, the administration of health
and sanitation regulations, and so on, is well known; 11 and the special def-
erence which authoritative decision-makers have in mutual tolerance long
accorded to claims justified in terms of security, such as with respect to
jurisdiction over pirates, activities in self-defense, the conducting of naval
maneuvers, and the protection of coastal approaches from hostile aircraft,
has often been noted.12  In: time of acknowledged war, of course, "freedom
of the seas" retires almost completely before both the older doctrines of
contraband, unneutral .service, blockade, ultimate destination, war zones,
and reprisals, and the newer administrative techniques of navicerts, ra-
tioning of neutrals, ship warrants, bunker control, insurance and credit
control, black-listing, and so on.""
The claim of the United States with respect to the hydrogen bomb tests
may be described factually as a claim to use territory (Bikini and Eniwetok
Atolls), over which it has jurisdiction, for purposes which have the effect
of temporarily excluding others from large areas of the high seas. The
extent to which past tests have actually interfered with commercial navi-
gation is, despite the size of the area affected, practically nil, and inter-
ference with fishing caused by the existence of the warning zones appears
to have been slight.
' The items cited in note 8 supra review this history, with references. See Boggs,
"National Claims in Adjacent Seas," 41 Geographical Rev. 185 (1951), with tabular
presentation.
12 For references, see Martial, "State Control of the Air Space over the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone," 30 Can. Bar Rev. 245 (1952), and Masterson, "The
Hemisphere Zone of Security and the Law," 26 A.B.A.T. 860 (1940).
13Higgins and Colombos, International Law of the Sea (2d ed. Colombos 1951)
Ohs. 14, 16-18, 20.
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The claim of the United States is obviously an unprecedented one, with
no close prior analogies, and plainly no existing prescriptions in the regime
of the high seas are literally applicable.14  The particular claim made bears
no similarity to the claims which, historically, "freedom of the seas" was
intended to combat: others are not excluded from the area affected in order
to enable the United States to grant trade or fishing monopolies to its na-
tionals or to pursue its commercial aggrandizement in any way; and others
are affected, irrespective of purposes, in such minimum degree as to cause
little offense to subordinate policies of preventing international frictions
arising from exercises of police powers upon the high seas.
What is most relevant in prior prescriptions from the regime of the high
seas, and can be applied without irrational extrapolation to this new prob-
lem of the hydrogen bomb tests, is simply the test of reasonableness-the
test by which the decision-makers of the world community have in modern
times adjudicated all controversies involving conflicts between claims to
navigation and fishing and other claims.
The claim of the United States is in substance a claim to prepare for
self-defense. It is not a claim to take the drastic measures of interference
with others-as, for example, the sinking of fleets or the invasion of terri-
tory-which are commonly subsumed under self-defense. It is, however,
a claim to take certain preparatory measures, with the minimum possible
interference with others, under the conditions of high necessity and ab-
sence of alternatives which are commonly held to justify measures in self-
defense. The conditions of this necessity and the absence of reasonable
alternatives are familiar knowledge. The contemporary development of
instruments of destruction makes it possible for a war-bent nation state
armed with thermonuclear weapons utterly to destroy an opponent and
perhaps much of the world. It has not been possible to establish, under
the United Nations or otherwise, either effective international control of
armaments or commitments and procedures of global scope which offer
reasonable assurance against aggression. As expectations of imminent
violence in the world arena have become ever more realistic and intense,
many of the nations of the free world have organized themselves, under
appropriate provisions of the United Nations Charter, into regional group-
ings for their more effective self-defense. The United States has under-
taken its program of atomic and thermonuclear weapons development to
ensure that these free nations are not lacking either in the retaliatory
power which may deter aggression or in the weapons of self-defense if de-
terrence fails. In this posture of world organization and crisis, which puts
so high a premium upon self-defense, with authorization of potentially the
most drastic interferences with others, it cannot, we suggest, be reasonably
concluded that it is unreasonable for the United States to engage in such
temporary and limited interferences with navigation and fishing as are
involved in the hydrogen bomb tests, in preparation for the defense of it-
self and its allies and of all the values of a free world society.
MYREs S. McDouGAL
14 Unless one regards as of sufficiently close analogy the long-standing practice, ap-
parently never questioned, of establishing the relatively smaller warning zones required
for conducting naval maneuvers and other peacetime defensive activities with safety.
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